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1. Introduction
The rights attached to authorship in joint works follow similar statutory definitions in
legislation in many countries, including the jurisdictions chosen for this study, Italy and the
United States of America (U.S.A.). Other than the usual differences that can be attributed to
language and drafting style which are typical of such distant legal traditions, at first glance
the only major difference is a slightly broader definition in the U.S.A.
However, when examining the rights that attach to works by more than one author
(subjective complex works), there are a number of factors that must be considered in order to
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determine how the work can be treated in addition to the bare legislative wording.1 The first
is the type of work.  Is the work of a singular nature, such as a literary work,  or does it
comprise of  a  blend,  for  example a cinematographic  work and a musical  work (objective
complex  works)?  The  second  consideration  is  whether  the  work  is  made  up  of
indistinguishable  or  of  distinguishable  contributions,  where  each  contribution  can  be
identified  as  coming  from  a  particular  author.  The  third  consideration  is  whether  the
contributions are dependent  or  independent.  One could have a  work,  such as a cartoon,
where the contributions are distinguishable but dependent, or a work where contributions are
distinguishable and independent, such as the illustration on the cover of a book. Finally, to
consider  the  intent  of  the  joint  authors  at  the  time  of  the  creation  of  the  joint  work  is
sometimes decisive.
 In our analysis we find that apart from the nature of  the work and intent of  the
authors,  the application of the rules of tenancy in common make a difference to the outcome
of allocation of rights, whether these are economic or moral rights. Such a special form of
tenancy,  which has its  basis  outside  copyright  law,  largely influences how the very  same
category of joint work is used in the two jurisdictions analysed in this article, and can inform
why, despite similar legislative statements, the category has had remarkably different kinds of
outcome in courts on the two sides of the Atlantic.2 
2. Unified by a different language
Regarding the similarity in the statutory definitions of the concept of joint works, it must be
noted  how  the  adoption  of  international  agreements  and  the  efforts  that  the  World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have put
into  harmonising  copyright  laws  are  considerable,  but  joint  works  have  always  been  a
marginal category. This is confirmed by the fact that the only mention of this category is in
the  Berne  Convention,  where  no  definition  of  the  concept  is  offered.3  An  alternative
explanation of  the similarity  might  flow from the nature of  collaborative creations,  being
homogeneous  worldwide,  no  matter  the  legal  tradition.  Such  socio-economic  explanation
undoubtedly welcomes the occurrence of  these kinds of  “evolutionary convergences” that
have been repeatedly identified in the field of legal anthropology.4
However, despite the similar statutory definitions, the resulting operative outcomes
are completely different. One could ascribe this to the slight variances in the wording of the
Acts  involved,  as  witnessed  by  Art.  10  of  the  Italian  Copyright  Act, 5 which  requires
indistinguishableness,  while  joint  works  in  the  U.S.A.  may  be  constituted  also  by
interdependent parts.6 However, such argument proves too weak to justify such a discrepancy
1  For a broad study on the issue of multiple authorship in Intellectual Property and how this
reflects on exclusivity, see: Alexander Peukert, “Individual, Multiple and Collective Ownership
of Intellectual Property Rights -  Which Impact on Exclusivity?”,  in Annette Kur & Vytautas
Mizaras (Eds.) “Can one size fit all?” Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, U.S., (Edward Elgar, 2010).
2  The English  translation  of  Italian is  used throughout (translation  by Thomas Margoni,
unless otherwise noted).
3 “ The provisions of the preceding article shall also apply in the case of a joint authorship
[...]”  see  Art.  7bis Berne  Convention  for the  protection  of  literary  and  artistic  works  of
September 9, 1886, as amended.
4  See Norbert Rouland, “Legal Anthropology”, (The Athlone Press, 1994); Rodolfo Sacco,
“Antropologia giuridica. Contributi ad una macrostoria del diritto” (Il Mulino, 2007).
5 See Art. 10 Italian Copyright Act (“Legge 22 aprile 1941 n. 633 e successive modificazioni -
Protezione del diritto d’autore e di altri diritti connessi al suo esercizio”, in G.U. n.166 del 16
luglio 1941) [Italian Copyright Act].
6 See  17 U.S.C.  § 101 (“An Act for the general revision of the Copyright Law, title 17 of the
United States Code, and for other purposes”, Pub. L. 94-553 – Oct. 19, 1976) [U.S. Copyright
Act].
by itself, especially if we consider – as it will be demonstrated infra – that the Italian system
also gives recognition to interdependent joint works, even though only implicitly, and with
some diverging opinions over substantial aspects of consequent ownership rules.
That being said, it is unquestionable that the American model seems to favour the use
of the joint works category. The statutory definition is broad, thereby facilitating the work of
practitioners and interpreters,  and the case law shows many examples of  its  application.
Nonetheless,  its overuse – caused by legislative reforms and technological  development –
demonstrates deficiencies with respect to the new (collaborative) production paradigm.7 
A better explanation, shown herein, is to be found in joint ownership rules that govern
these situations. Tenancy in common, originally drafted for material goods in both systems,
operates very differently from one legal system to another. It could be said that while in Italy
tenancy in common is  based on a “joint administration” rule (amministrazione congiunta,
where unanimity or qualified majorities are required for most uses), the opposite happens in
the U.S.A., where the system operates on a “separate administration” rule (amministrazione
disgiunta,  where  each  co-author  may  proceed  with  every  type  of  use,  with  few,  though
important,  exceptions).  In  this  article  we  will  observe  how  these  two  system  paradigms
operate, and offer a synthesis capable of supporting a solution that is both fair and efficient.
3. The atomisation of property rights 
Art. 10 of the Italian Copyright Act, dealing with joint works (opere in comunione), reads:8
“1. If the work has been created with the indistinguishable and
inseparable  contributions  of  a  plurality  of  persons,  copyright
vests commonly in all co-authors.
2.  The  undivided  parts  are  presumed  of  equal  value,  except
where there is a written agreement to the contrary.
3. Provisions on tenancy in common are applicable. Moral rights
may  be  invoked  by  each  co-author  and  the  work  may  not  be
published,  if  unpublished,  nor  may  it  be  modified  or  used
differently from the first publication without the agreement of all
co-authors. Nonetheless, in case of unjustified refusal of one or
more co-authors, publication, modification, or new usage of the
work may be authorised by the judicial authority, and accordingly
used.”
It  has  been  pointed  out  that  “indistinguishable  and  inseparable  contribution  of  a
plurality  of  persons”  requires  the  “converging  intent  of  authors  not  only  to  join  for  the
creation of the work, but also to accept the contraction of one's own personal creativity in
favour of the outcome of the collaboration, which [...] tends to become subjective, and thus,
the work not being the exclusive child of any co-author, the umbilical cord that binds it to its
author is cut.”9
7  In addition to the example of cinematographic works and animation movies, consider for
instance  Web2.0,  user  generated  content,  social  media,  collaborative  platforms  such  as
Wikipedia, computer-generated works and many more. For an early study on these aspects see
Margaret Chon, “New wine bursting from old bottles: collaborative Internet art, Joint works,
and entrepreneurship”, in Oregon Law Review, 1996; For a recent analysis on the ownership
status  of  computer-generated works  in  absence of  human intervention,  see:  Mark Perry  &
Thomas Margoni, “From music tracks to Google maps: Who owns computer-generated works?”,
in The Computer Law and Security Review – The International Journal of Technology Law and
Practice, 2010, 26.6, 621- 629. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1647584.
8 See Art. 10 Italian Copyright Act, supra note 5.
9 Vittorio M. De Sanctis, “I Soggetti Del Diritto D’autore”, 2nd ed. 76-77 (Giuffrè, 2005).
In other words, for joint authorship, two requirements need to be met. An objective
one, indistinguishableness and inseparableness as explicitly provided in the Act, which is a
minimum condition but is not sufficient by itself. Furthermore, there is a subjective condition,
that  the  authors  contemplate,  or  agree,  that  the joint  work  is  something more  than two
individual – though inseparable and indistinguishable – pieces struck together. The work is
meant to be a single  new entity that represents something more than the mere sum of the
initial contributions, first and foremost in the mind of its authors. With regard to the type of
contribution, interpreters agree that the collaborators need to make a creative contribution to
be  co-authors,  since  it  is  not  sufficient  to  give  mere  suggestions,  technical  indications,
editorial collaboration, and so forth,10 as a creative and original expression is required by the
Act to qualify for protection.11
Art. 10 also provides that a work, in order to be considered a collaborative creation,
has to be a “simple work”, meaning that it is not admissible for an objective complex work to
fit in Art. 10 definition. An objective complex work represents a work where there are many
distinguishable contributions,  while a subjective complex work is a work where there are
many  distinguishable  authors.12 However  Art.  10  does  not  cover  all  of  the  possible
materialisations  of  collaborative  works.  The  Italian  Copyright  Act  recognizes  another
category,  that  of  “composite  works”,  although only implicitly.  Unlike collective  works and
“simple” collaborative creations, the composite works category is not specified in the Act.
Nonetheless, in Sec. I and III of subtitle IV, “dramatic-musical works, musical compositions
with  words,  choreographic  and  pantomimic  works”13 and  “cinematographic  works”14 are
recognised. As we will see, for these works that are distinguishable (objectively complex), the
Act prescribes specific tenancy in common rules.
The  composite  works  category  is  characterised  by  the  fact  that  contributions  are
distinguishable,  although  not  separable.  In  a  musical  composition  with  words,  or  in  a
cinematographic work the different parts,  such as music,  words,  soundtrack,  and images,
each  type  can  be  differentiated  and  has  its  own  characteristics.  Nevertheless,  they  are
created to be experienced together as a unitary work. Thus, while one of the prerequisites of
Art. 10 is still present (inseparability), the other is manifestly absent (indistinguishability).
Though there is no general provision recognising the whole category, commentators
agree that there is no reason to deny the existence and applicability for the category of
composite works for types of works other than those listed in Arts. 33 – 37 and 44 – 50, so
long as the remaining requirements of the collaborative creation are fulfilled.15 Thus, when
dealing with text and images, as in the case of a comic, it is clear that we are in presence of a
composite work, while in the case of a novel accompanied by images that illustrate the text,
10  Maurizio  Ammendola,  Diritto  d'autore  (voce),  in  “Digesto  delle  discipline  privatistiche,
Sezione commerciale, Vol. IV” 372-392 (Utet, 1989); Greco P. (1952), “Collaborazione creativa e
comunione dei diritti d'autore”, in  Dir. Autore, 1, at  14-16; Eduardo  Piola Caselli,  Codice del
diritto d'autore - Commentario della nuova legge 22 aprile 1941-XIX, N. 633 at 261-263 (Utet,
1943); Zara Oliva  Algardi, “La tutela dell'opera dell'ingegno e il plagio” 122 (Cedam, 1978);
Tullio  Ascarelli,  “Teoria  della  concorrenza  e  dei  beni  immateriali” 773-774 (Giuffrè,  1960);
Ubertazzi L. C. (2003), “Spunti sulla comunione di diritti d'autore”, in “Annali it. dir. Autore”, at
506,  507-508;  Vittorio  M.  De  Sanctis  &  Mario  Fabiani,  “I  contratti  di  diritto  d'autore”,  in
Antonio Cicu & Francesco Messineo, “Trattato di diritto civile e commerciale, vol. XXXI” t. 1,
72 (Giuffrè, 2000).
11  It must be noted that unlike in the U.S.A. situation, no fixation requirement is needed. Art.
2-1, listing protected subject matters, reads “literary, dramatic, scientific, didactic, religious
works being in written or oral form.”
12  Paolo  Greco  &  Paolo  Vercellone,  “I  diritti  sulle  opere  dell'ingegno” 97  (Utet,  1974);
Maurizio Ammendola, Diritto d'autore (voce), in “digesto delle discipline privatistiche, Sezione
commercial, vol. IV” 392 (Utet, 1989); De Sanctis, supra note 9, at 85.
13 Sec. I, Arts. 33 to 37 Italian Copyright Act.
14 Sec. III, Arts. 44 to 50 Italian Copyright Act.
15  As early as 1948 prof. Greco criticised Art. 10 for its obscure and misguiding meaning. See
Paolo Greco, “I Diritti Sui Beni Immateriali” 222-223 (Giappichelli, 1948).
we are  in  the  presence  of  two different  works  that  remain  autonomous.16 In  the  former
example, text and images are merged into a unitary work and both will lose their creative
message and function if perceived without the other, that is to say, if individually presented,
they will  be perceived as incomplete. In the latter example,  the novel will  bear the same
creative message even if presented without images. Even though the images may improve the
aesthetic appearance of the novel, they will not substantially modify the novel’s content or
expressive form. The illustrations may also stand alone as artworks. However, in the case of a
scientific book, where illustrations are repeatedly used to explain the content (as with a book
of  anatomical  medicine)  and  are  an  essential  part  for  the  comprehension  of  the  book's
message, it could well be that we are dealing with a composite work.17
3.1 The twists of interlocking prohibitions
One of the most notable consequences of a collaborative work’s status is the ownership rules
applicable to co-authors. In the case of Art. 10, rules of comunione (tenancy in common) are
to be applied (Arts. 10-1 and 10-3). Italian law provides a detailed description of the rules on
tenancy in common in Art. 1100 et seq of the Civil Code. Those rules are aimed at covering
every type of common tenancy contemplated by law, but it is evident that when drafting this
category,  non-physical  products were not considered.18 Even though some of the rules on
tenancy in common provided by the Civil Code are directly applicable to non-physical goods,
others  are  not.  Since  non-physical  products  encompass  some  specific  idiosyncrasies,  for
example to be non-rival to consumption and non excludable, a generalised application of the
rules of tenancy in common from Art. 1100  et seq Civil Code becomes problematic. In the
case  of  Italian  works  of  authorship,  another  layer  of  complexity  is  represented  by  the
presence on moral rights.
Art. 10 of the Copyright Act recognises this difficulty by providing an exception for
specifically identified activities. To begin with, Art. 10 sets forth a iuris tantum presumption of
equality of quotes, that is to say, in absence of a written agreement to the contrary, all co-
authors  own  an  equal  share  of  the  whole  (Art.  10-2).19 Such  a  provision  is  a  logical
consequence of Art. 10, where it provides that only indistinguishable parts may form a joint
work.
Secondly, moral rights are apparently exempted from tenancy in common, since each
co-author can resort to the courts individually (Art. 10-3). Moral rights are personal rights,
and  Art.  22  of  the  Copyright  Act  defines  them as  inalienable  and  not  waivable,  so  this
individual  ability  to  avail  oneself  of  a  remedy  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  general
framework of such legal system. However, scholars have questioned whether all moral rights
can be invoked by each co-author disjunctively, or whether for some of them all the joint
authors would need to join action. General principles set forth by the Copyright Act, the Civil
Code, and the Constitution in Italy suggest that, besides those rights strictly connected with
the honour and reputation of each co-author (the right to authorship and the right to integrity,
Art.  20 of  the Italian Copyright Act),  the defence of the remaining moral rights could be
activated only with unanimity of the co-authors. The reason for this distinction lies in the fact
16 Paolo Greco & Paolo Vercellone, “I diritti sulle opere dell'ingegno” 250 (Utet, 1974).
17 Id., at 251.
18  In title VII  of  the 3rd book of the civil  code,  subtitle I  (Art.  1100 to 1116) deals with
“comunione  in  generale”,  while  subtitle  II  (Art.  1117  to  1139)  deals  with  the  tenancy  in
common of buildings (“del condominio negli edifici”).
19  Iuris tantum (comparable to a rebuttable presumption in common law systems) refers to a
legal  presumption  where  a  contrary  proof  is  admitted,  in  contrast  to  a  iuris  et  de  iuire
presumption,  where  no  proof  to  the  contrary  is  possible  (comparable  to  a  conclusive  or
irrebuttable presumption in common law systems). However, in the present case, due to an
explicit statutory provision, not every means of proof will be acceptable, as happens for the
generality of “simple” presumptions contained in the Act. Here, only a written agreement to
the contrary will be accepted to prove the contrary and win the presumption.
that this second class of moral rights (composed by the right to withdrawal under Art. 142
and the right  to  first  unedited publication under  Art.  24)  is  strongly  connected with the
collaborative creation. Further, their individual activation would significantly influence the
concomitant usage by other co-authors, and in some cases, render it impossible.20 
Accordingly,  a  general  rule of  tenancy in common may also  be affirmed for  moral
rights,  with  the  exception  of  those,  whose  essence  is  ontologically  connected  with  the
personality, honour, and reputation of the author, namely the right to authorship and the right
to integrity.
Regarding economic rights,  Arts.  10-3 explicitly  states that  all  uses that  were not
already approved at the time of the first publication need a unanimous decision of all co-
authors. This point represents a major exception to the tenancy in common rules set forth by
art.  1100  et  seq Civil  Code,  where  for  all  uses  defined  as  “ordinary  administration”  the
authorisation by a majority is deemed sufficient.21 By combining Arts. 10-3 with the rules ex
Art. 1100 et seq Civil Code, we observe that only those uses already permitted under the first
publication, which requires unanimity, may be reauthorized by the majority. To illustrate, two
authors out of three, may authorise a new edition of a book, but unanimity will be required for
a translation. An important exception must be applied to this rule, namely that in Art. 1108-3
of  the Civil  Code,  requiring unanimity for  uses  exceeding a nine-year  period,  which is  a
mandatory case of “extraordinary administration.”22 Therefore, if a use, already authorised at
the time of first publication, is to be conceded for a period exceeding nine years, then it
represents a use of “extraordinary administration” and unanimous deliberation is once again
required.23
The  rationale  of  Art.  1108-3  holds  true  for  other  forms  of  exploitation  such  as
licensing. In particular, in this latter case, it has to be noted that: (a) only a non-exclusive
licence may be authorised without unanimity, as an exclusive licence is a form of usage of the
common good that reduces and limits the other tenants in common (thus representing an act
of “extraordinary administration”), and (b) the non-exclusive licence cannot exceed a nine
year time frame to be authorized by a majority.
3.2 Beyond the surface: the composite work category
In the case of composite works and the consequent ownership status, the issue becomes even
more intricate. First, since there is only an implicit recognition of the category, there are no
legal provisions furnishing a clear and unambiguous regulation. Second, rules applying to
20  Greco P. (1952), Collaborazione creativa e comunione dei diritti d'autore, in Dir. Autore, 1,
at  24-25;  Greco  &  Vercellone,  supra  note  12,  at  224-226;  Zara  Oliva  Algardi,  “La  tutela
dell'opera dell'ingegno e il  plagio” 122 (Cedam, 1978); contra Maurizio Ammendola, Diritto
d'autore (voce), in “Digesto delle discipline privatistiche, Sezione commerciale, vol.  IV” 393
(Utet, 1989); Gerardo Santini, “I diritti della personalità nel diritto industrial” 50-53 (Cedam,
1959); Tullio Ascarelli, “Teoria della concorrenza e dei beni immateriali” 775 (Giuffrè, 1960).
Unanimity for the first publication is not really under debate, since the same art. 10 clearly
states that a deliberation of all co-authors is necessary.
21  Ordinary administration refers to those acts by which individuals tend to conserve the
effective substance of the assets, doing nothing more then perceiving the fruits, while through
extraordinary  administration  acts  individuals  change  the  economic  essence  and  the  legal
framework of the assets; see Pietro Trimarchi, “Istituzioni di Diritto Privato” 62-65 (Giuffrè,
2005).  This  distinction  is  substantially  accepted  by  copyright  scholars;  see  Vittorio  M.  De
Sanctis  &  Mario  Fabiani,  “I  contratti  di  diritto  d'autore”,  in  Antonio  Cicu  &  Francesco
Messineo, “Trattato di diritto civile e commerciale, vol. XXXI” t. 1, 82 (Giuffrè, 2000).
22  Art. 1108 of the Civil Code is entitled “Innovations and others acts exceeding ordinary
administration” and lists activities that requires qualified majority or, as in the present case,
unanimity.
23  Greco & Vercellone, supra note 12, at 228; Maurizio Ammendola, “Diritto d'autore (voce)”,
in “Digesto delle discipline privatistiche, Sezione commerciale, vol. IV” 392-393 (Utet, 1989).
Sec. I and III, subtitle IV of the Italian Copyright Act are in some aspects strongly subject
matter specific. This means that their extensive application is likely to be discarded, or at
least  very  problematic,  in  all  those  cases  where  the  type  of  work  changes  substantially.
Nevertheless, it seems uncontroversial that: (a) the legislator intended to also allow tenancy
in common for works ex Arts. 33 – 37 and 44 – 50; and more importantly, (b) a general rule of
tenancy in common may be envisioned for the whole category of composite works – which is
not limited to those works explicitly listed in Sec. IV.
The applicability of tenancy in common may be derived both from the wording used by
the Act and from the dominant doctrine.24 The latter is that the lack of indistinguishableness
does  not  exclude  tenancy  in  common.25 Although,  such  an  absence  justifies  a  different
workability of the rules between tenants in common.26
The same Secs. I and III, subtitle IV provide some specific rules on how to calculate
the share corresponding to each co-author, in a way proportional to their role and on who is
enabled to exercise the economic rights. For instance, Art. 34 establishes that the exercise of
economic rights belongs to the author of the musical contribution (34-1) and that she has a
duty to account to the other contributors proportional to the value of each share (34-2), and
then gives a precise indication on how to calculate the amount of each contribution (34-3 and
34-4).27 It has to be noted that such rules apply only in cases where the parties have not
agreed otherwise.28
In the case of cinematographic works, the tenancy in common rules operate loosely,
since although co-authors are deemed to be four pre-established subjects,29 Art. 45-1 of the
Italian Copyright Act allocates the exercise of the economic rights to the producer, who is
obliged to account to the former.30 Even so, except for where is an agreement to the contrary,
the  producer  will  not  be  able  to  perform  or  display  any  modification,  elaboration,  or
translation without the consent of all the co-authors.
Turning our attention to point b), namely the applicability of a general rule of tenancy
in common for the whole category of composite works – beyond those works explicitly listed
in Sec. IV – scholars agree that such applicability is in accordance with the Copyright Act and
the general principles of the law.31 Thus, all those works that are created through a creative
24  The Act uses words like “comunione” (art. 34) when identifying the holder of the economic
rights, and “coautori” (art. 44) when dealing with the authorship of cinematographic works.
25  Paolo  Greco,  “I  diritti  sui  beni  immateriali” 394  (Giappichelli,  1948);  Ubertazzi  L.  C.,
“Spunti sulla comunione di diritti d'autore”, in “Annali it. dir. Autore” 508 (2003).
26  Maurizio  Ammendola,  Diritto  d'autore  (voce),  in  Digesto  delle  discipline  privatistiche,
Sezione commerciale, vol. IV at 219 (Utet, 1989).
27  Art. 34-3 reads: ”In lyric works it is established that the value of the musical contribution
represents the three quarters (¾) of the whole work”; Art. 34-4 reads: ”in operettas, melologos,
musical compositions with words, ballets and musical ballets, the value of the two contributions
is deemed equal.”
28  Art.  33,  opening  Sec.  I,  reads:  ”In  the  absence  of  specific  agreements  among  the
contributors [...] the rules of the next 3 Arts. shall apply.” It must be noted, however, that in
cases of tenancy in common originated by an agreement, only the rules set forth by art. 1100
et seq civil code apply, excluding the important provisions rising from art. 10 LDA. In particular
only economic rights will fall into the tenancy in common, being the moral ones left off; see De
Sanctis, supra note 9, at 90-91.
29  Co-authors of the cinematographic work are deemed to be the author of the screenplay,
the author  of  the script,  the author  of  the music,  and  the artistic  director;  art.  44 Italian
Copyright Act.
30  Vittorio M. De Sanctis & Mario Fabiani, “I contratti di diritto d'autore”, in Antonio Cicu &
Francesco  Messineo, “Trattato di diritto civile e commerciale, vol. XXXI” t. 1,  71-72 (Giuffrè,
2000).
31  Paolo  Greco,  “I  diritti  sui  beni  immateriali” 220  (Giappichelli,  1948);  Greco  P.,
“Collaborazione creativa e comunione dei diritti d'autore”, in “Dir. Autore”, 1, 2-4 (1952); Greco
& Vercellone, supra note 12, at 252; Maurizio Ammendola, “Diritto d'autore (voce)”, in “Digesto
delle discipline privatistiche, Sezione commerciale, vol. IV” 394 (Utet, 1989);  Ubertazzi L. C.,
“Spunti sulla comunione di diritti d'autore”, in “Annali it. dir. Autore”, 509 (2003); Vittorio M.
De Sanctis  &  Mario  Fabiani,  “I  contratti  di  diritto  d'autore”,  in  Antonio  Cicu &  Francesco
collaboration of two or more authors, but where the contributions remain distinguishable yet
inseparable  since  merged into  a  unitary  whole,  are  governed by  the  rules  of  tenancy in
common.
The most  controversial  point  here is  evidently  represented by the suggestion that
following Art. 10 of the Italian Copyright Act, contributions need to be indistinguishable. As
early as 1952, Professor Greco pointed out how such an interpretation, even if ostensible
from a superficial reading of Art. 10, is not consistent with the Act or the general principles of
the law.32 If we were to follow such an interpretation of Art. 10, there would be an unjustified
divergent treatment for objective simple and complex collaborative works, when the reason
for a tenancy in common rule is rooted not in the objective classification of the contribution,
but in a subjective view of collaboration conducing to a multi-authored creative product.33
Hence, in spite of those cases specifically regulated by the law (Arts. 33 – 37 and 44 –
50), in cases where we are faced with a collaborative work constituted by distinguishable
contributions, a general rule of tenancy in common is deemed applicable, even if there are
some  differences  as  to  the  workability  in  Art.  10  Italian  Copyright  Act.  Given  that  the
contributions are distinguishable, it would no longer be acceptable to presume an equality of
shares through a simple presumption (iuris tantum) that, however, may be overcome only
through  a  written  agreement  to  the  contrary.  Since  every  contribution  is  separately
perceivable and directly attributable to its author, it seems evident that such a “simple but
strong” presumption is no longer justifiable, and that a rule based on proportionality should
be  applied  by  judges  in  all  those  cases  where  co-authors  successfully  prove  a  different
amount in their contributions.34
Consequently,  in  a  case  of  tenancy  in  common  for  a  composite  work,  there  still
remains a presumption of equality of shares, but this presumption does not derive from Art.
10, which is not applicable because of the lack of indistinguishability, but from the general
rule  of  tenancy  in  common  set  forth  in  Art.  1101  of  the  Italian  Civil  Code.  The  most
remarkable practical  difference, is that such latter presumption may be overcome by any
mean of proof, and not only by a written agreement to the contrary, as it is the case for Art.
10 Copyright Act.35
Regarding the possibility of co-authors using their contributions separately, once again
cases of simple collaborative works (Art. 10 of the Italian Copyright Act) and of composite
works must be differentiated. For the former, there is simply no possibility of separate uses
since the contributions are indistinguishable. In the case of Art. 10, co-authors cannot use
their contributions separately, otherwise, the work would not be indistinguishable. In the case
of composite works, such reuse is allowed as a general rule. In fact, since the contributions
are distinguishable,  they may be used as a part  of the unitary work that they have been
created for, as well as separately. This characteristic of non-physical property (to be non-rival
in consumption) is idiosyncratic and differs totally in the case of material goods.
However, a line must be drawn between composite works specifically typified by the
Act (Arts. 33 – 37 and 44 – 50) and those that are not. The Act provides some specific rules,
depending on the type of work. For example, Arts. 35 and 36 (musical compositions with
words, dramas, choreographic works) state that the author of the literary part of the work
may  not  connect  it  to  another  musical,  with  some  specific  exceptions  connected  to  the
Messineo, “Trattato di diritto civile e commerciale, vol. XXXI” t. 1, 70 (Giuffrè, 2000); Eduardo
Piola Caselli, “Codice del diritto d'autore - Commentario della nuova legge” 22 aprile 1941-XIX,
N. 633 at  261 (Utet, 1943); Tullio  Ascarelli, “Teoria della concorrenza e dei beni immateriali
“777 (Giuffrè, 1960);  Zara Oliva  Algardi,  “La tutela dell'opera dell'ingegno e il  plagio” 124
(Cedam, 1978).
32  Greco P., “Collaborazione creativa e comunione dei diritti d'autore”, in “Dir. Autore”, 1, at
2 (1952).
33 Id., at 14-18.
34  Paolo Greco, “I diritti sui beni immateriali” 220 (Giappichelli, 1948). Ubertazzi sustains
that in this, as in other similar cases, it should operate a rule of proportionality, deriving this
argument  from constitutional  principles;  Ubertazzi  L.  C.,  “Spunti  sulla  comunione di  diritti
d'autore”, in “Annali it. dir. Autore”, 511-514 (2003).
35  Greco, supra note 25, at 35; Ubertazzi L. C., “Spunti sulla comunione di diritti d'autore”, in
“Annali it. dir. Autore”, 512 (2003).
passage of time or some sort of contractual non-fulfilment by the composer. In this case, no
unfair competition concerns arise, since the reuse is only allowed when the composite work
has no commercial value at all, because it has never been completed, or once completed, it
has never been performed or displayed to the public, or after first performance or display, it
has not been performed or displayed again for a considerable period of time (2 or 10 years,
respectively).36
Conversely,  regarding  those  composite  works  that  do  not  receive  any  explicit
regulation, the only limit to the reuse of contributions lies in the economic prejudice that such
an autonomous usage may cause to  the composite  work.  Evidently,  this  may happen if  a
contribution (suppose a textual contribution) is going to be connected to another contribution
(such as images), which is of the same sort of contribution as the original composite work, in
a way that the new composite work will  economically compete with the original one. The
rationale lies in the general rule that may be derived from Art. 1102 of the Civil Code, which
prohibits  tenants  in  common to  use  the  common good in  a way that  forms obstacles  or
prejudices to the use of the other tenants.37
In light of the situation here depicted, it is no surprise that in Italy, both the dominant
doctrine and courts prefer the category of collective works for many types of multi-authored
works such as multimedia works, on-line course-ware and other similar collaborative efforts,
and the reason may find its roots in the complexity of the rules on joint ownership.38 Such
complexity, which as we have seen normally requires unanimity for any use or at least for
those that have substantial economic value, and concerns relating to the characteristic of
indistinguishableness and the connected uncertainty in the field of composite works, play,
consciously  or  not,  an  important  role  in  such  a  preference,  as  may be  witnessed by  the
relative scarcity of case law on joint works. For all these reasons the Italian approach has
favoured the departure from the joint work category – or more correctly, determined the fact
that it has never been seriously considered for a generalised usage – and pushed for the use
of the category of collective works. 
In  the  next  sections  of  this  paper,  we  will  observe  how  in  the  U.S.A.  works  of
interdependent  contributions  are  expressly  admitted  in  the  joint  works  category,  making
things easier for interpreters and commentators. Moreover, tenancy in common rules permit
every co-author to use, reuse, and license the whole work, the only limit being a duty to
account. Such system of administration of the common good (separate, in contrast to joint) is
much more efficient for the economic existence and dissemination of the work. In Italy, a kind
of “mutual veto” can be identified, or economically speaking, a manifestation of a “tragedy of
anticommons”: the disagreement that may originate between parties – who are jointly vested
with the same property right – with regard to various aspects of the economic life and the
circulation of the work (and connected transaction costs) is capable of halting such economic
circulation and thus bringing about the “destruction” of the work.39 In a situation like the one
here depicted, it is clear how a solution – unanimity – that on a theoretical level seems to be
the most fair, proves to be so inefficient as to become, practically, unfair.40
36 De Sanctis, supra note 9, at 92.
37 Greco & Vercellone, supra note 12, at 252.
38  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  how  the  courts  would  have  decided  in  the  case  of
cinematographic works in absence of a joint works ex lege provision, such as the one present in
the Italian Copyright Act.
39  Michael A. Heller, “The tragedy of the anticommons: property in the transition from Marx
to markets”, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621, (1998).
40 For an example of a “tragedy of the anticommons” caused by Italian tenancy in common rules –
though the situation of tenancy in common is coming from inheritance law and is applied to
tangible property –  see Ugo  Mattei, Compararive Law and Economics 65 (The University of
Michigan Press, 1997).
4  Creative  control  or  dominant  author:  towards  a  Feist+
standard?
The U.S.A. Copyright Act defines a joint work as follows: 41
A “joint work” is a work prepared by two or more authors with
the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.
Key elements here are the “intent requisite” and the fact that a joint work may be
constituted of both inseparable and interdependent contributions. Starting with the latter, it
must be noted how not just  works composed of inseparable contributions – that is works
where contributions, once merged, are no longer recognisable – but also works composed by
interdependent parts, fit in this category.
Interdependent contributions have been defined as “contributions that are assembled
into a unified whole, rather than being recast and incorporated into the whole” 42 and where
“one component of the work is influenced or controlled by the other.” 43 Examples of this kind
of joint work include music compositions with lyrics, architectural projects joined with music
or video,  illustrated poems,  and generally all  multimedia works.  The application ambit  of
interdependent  contributions  is  to  cover  works  where  elements  pertaining  to  different
branches of the arts are assembled together in a unitary whole.
The idea that  joint  works may be made up of  interdependent  contributions is  not
problematic in itself, but it becomes an issue when we analyse the ownership consequences of
joint authorship;  that  is,  once again,  the application of  the rules on tenancy in common.
However, before proceeding in this direction, the intent requirement needs to be addressed.
Intent is present if “each of the authors prepared his or her contribution with the
knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the contributions of other authors as
inseparable  or  interdependent  parts  of  a  unitary  whole.”44 The  touchstone  here  is  the
intention, at the time of writing the contribution, that the parts be absorbed or combined into
an integrated unit.45 It is evident, though not necessarily the case, that a shared intent is
present in situations where co-authors work together physically and at the same time. Shared
intent could also be present when parties are not collaborating at the same time or in the
same place or in concert,  so long as such intent is present when co-authors create their
contribution, which may come into existence at any time, even when one (or some) of the
works is already completed, or not yet conceived. That is to say, when a party makes a sole
contribution with the intention to merge it with another as to form a unitary whole, then the
intent requisite is fulfilled.46
In  spite  of  this  quite  detailed  definition,  case  law  shows  a  long  list  of  different
interpretations and variations of this theme. For instance, the nature of such intention (should
the author want co-authorship and should be aware of the legal consequences thereof, or is a
mere intention toward a unitary result enough?), or the exact moment of its occurrence (at
the very beginning of the joint activity, before the work is concluded, or after that), have been
and remain highly debated issues in courts and among commentators.47
41 17 U.S.C. § 101.
42  Melville  B.  Nimmer & David Nimmer, “Nimmer on copyright:  a  treatise on the law of
literary,  musical  and  artistic  property  and the protection  of  ideas”,  Sec.  6.04,  at  6-12 (M.
Bender, 1963).
43  Nancy Perkins Spyke, “The joint work dilemma: The separately copyrightable contribution
requirement and co-ownership principles”, 40 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 463 (1993).
44  See House  Report  on  Copyright,  H.R.  Rep.  No.  94-1476  (1976),  reprinted  in  1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
45 Id., at 5736-5737.
46  Nimmer, supra note 42, Sec. 6.03, at 6-6 – 6-7; Paul Goldstein, “Copyright: principles, law,
and practice” Sec. 4.2.1, at 4:8 (Little, Brown, 1989).
47  After the 1976 Copyright Act enactment, courts turned their interest over the nature of the
Moreover,  courts,  in  their  effort  to  narrow  the  applicability  of  joint  works,  have
created some  ex novo concepts,  such as “dominant author” or “creative control”,  without
providing  precise  definitions.48 Obviously,  this  attitude  does  not  shed  any  light  onto  this
already hazy landscape. Scholars have strongly criticised this judicial approach,49 as most of
these concepts are totally unknown to the Copyright Act or its legislative history, and in some
cases, are inconsistent with both.50
Likewise, it has been sustained that the “Goldstein standard” supports per se the same
narrowing  of  results,  without  all  these  interpretative  problems  that  originate  from  the
creation of new concepts.51 The Goldstein standard affirms that in order to be eligible for co-
authorship in a joint work, each contribution should be independently copyrightable.52 This
reasoning is rooted in the general principles of the Act that require an activity to be original
in  order  to  qualify  for  copyright  protection.  Accordingly,  it  is  consistent  with  the  Act  to
recognize co-authorship exclusively to those co-authors who submit contributions that are
autonomously  copyrightable.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  provide  a  “more  than  de  minimis”
contribution; something that is more than ideas, comments, suggestions or facts, but not yet
copyrightable.  Additionally,  it  is  required  that  such  a  creative  effort  be  expressed  in  an
original form.53 Such an approach would  per se considerably limit the applicability of joint
intent,  as LaFrance remarks,  see Mary  LaFrance,  “Authorship,  dominance and the captive
collaborator: preserving the rights of joint authors”, 50  Emory L. J. 193,  214-16 (2001); See
also Childress v. Taylor, 945 F. 2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991); Erickson v. Trinity Theater, Inc., 13
F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994). But see contra Words & Data, Inc. v. GTE Communications Services,
Inc., 765 F. Supp. 570 (W.D.Mo. 1991), where, relying on Nimmer, Judge Burtlett affirms that
“each contributor automatically acquires an individual ownership on the entire work” and that
“the intent necessary for joint authorship is the intention, at the time the writing is done, that
the parts  be absorbed or combined into  an integrated  unit  [...]”,  id.,  at  574-575;  see also
Nimmer (1963),  supra note 42, Sec. 6.03, at 6-6; House Report, note 44, at 5736. In another
decision  delivered  after  the  enactment  of  the  1976  Copyright  Act  –  where  a  joint  work
definition is  present  –  the Second Circuit  stated that  it  was no longer  acceptable a  broad
definition of joint work and that an actual collaboration in the creation of the work is necessary,
being not acceptable that a joint ownership in a work implies joint authorship in a derivative
work thereof, see Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 (2d Cir. 1989).
48 “It is only where the dominant author intends to be sharing authorship that joint authorship
will  result”,  Childress,  945 F.2d at 508, citing  Fisher v.  Klein,  16 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1795 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). For the “creative control” concept,  see Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir.
1998), where the court elaborates such concepts and gives some guidance on how to interpret
them through the “decision making authority” test.
49  This approach is particularly sustained in the 2d, 7th and 9th Circuits; they are the federal
appellate  courts  that  hear  the  large majority  of  copyright  cases  and thus  are  particularly
influential in this field.
50  See Mary LaFrance, “Authorship, dominance and the captive collaborator: preserving the
rights of joint authors”, 50 Emory L. J. 193, 224 (2001); referring to the “dominant authorship”
as relevant to the joint work analysis in the Childress approach.
51 Id., at 225 – 226.
52  See Paul  Goldstein, “Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice” Sec. 4.2.1, at 4:13 (Little,
Brown, 1989). “A collaborative contribution will not produce a joint work, and a contributor will
not obtain a co-ownership interest, unless the contribution represents original expression that
could stand on its own as the subject matter of copyright. Sec. 101's definition of a joint work
as a work prepared by two or more “authors” implies that the contribution of each must be a
copyrightable  “work  of  authorship”  within  the  terms  of  Sec.  102(a)”;  “Further,  since  any
subject matter that does not meet the Copyright Act's copyrightability standards lies in the
public domain, an author is – absent an agreement to the contrary or liability based on some
other legal rule – free to use uncopyrightable contributions made by other, and need not share
with them any of the proceeds from the work's exploitation.”
53  The “more than de minimis standard” has been proposed by Professor M. Nimmer, but has
never gathered much support in courts. The reason why seems apparent, since if courts are
concerned with the reduction of joint works applicability, than a more stringent standard, as
the “independent copyrightable” one, is more useful than a standard which allows secondary
collaborators to claim joint authorship. See Nimmer, supra note 42, Sec. 6.07, at 6-21; for an
works. Indeed, courts have accepted and used the Goldstein standard in their decisions, but,
consciously or not, deemed it insufficient to solely reduce the applicability.54
More recently, in Aalmuhammed v. Lee55 the Ninth Circuit tried to address the issue of
joint authorship by elucidating a previous decision's understanding of the “intent-to-share-
authorship” requirement. Furthermore, the court introduced a somewhat more original vision
of  the  term  “author”,  a  kind  of  “more-than-Goldstein”  standard.  While  stating  that
Aalmuhammed was not a joint author because neither Lee nor Warner Brothers intended to
share  authorship  with  the  plaintiff,  the  court  also  affirmed  that  the  contribution  of
Aalmuhammed was “not authorial.”
Both components of the holding need clarification. With regard to the intention to
share authorship, the Ninth Circuit seemingly goes a little bit further than the Second and
Seventh  circuit,  by  affirming  that  “[...]  putative  co-authors  [have  to]  make  objective
manifestations of a shared intent to be co-authors” and that “we [the court] say objective
manifestations because, were the mutual intent to be determined by subjective intent, it could
become an instrument of fraud, were one co-author to hide from the other an intention to
take sole credit for the work.”56
Likewise, by dealing with the term “author” the Ninth Circuit tells us that there are
different kinds of authors and thus different levels of authorship. Whereas in a “normal work”
like a mono-authored novel,  it  is  very easy to say who the author is,  in the case of joint
authorship things change. Following the court’s rationale, while originality in such a novel
should follow the  Feist57 requirement of  a modicum of creativity,  in a joint work it  is  not
feasible to recognise every (original) contribution as co-authorial, since it would mean sharing
ownership  among too many individuals.  One should  think about  the situation  that  would
emerge  in  cases  of  those subjective (and objective)  very complex  works,  such as  motion
pictures,58 or some types of multimedia works, or the case of on-line course-ware or course
packages recalled earlier in this paragraph.
The court sustained that when deciding on the authorship of a complex work,  the
inquiry should go in the direction of the “creative control.” Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit –
apparently resurrecting the concept of dominant author59 – affirms that “Aalmuhammed did
not at any time have superintendence of the work” or any other form of control, and that he
“was not the person who has actually formed the picture by putting the persons in position,
and arranging the place”, and thus he “lacked control over the work, and absence of control
is strong evidence of the absence of co-authorship.”60 The fact that the same court recognizes
application of this standard see  Words & Data, 765 F. Supp.,  supra note 47. According with
Prof.  Nimmer,  “neither  the text  nor  legislative  history  of  the  Act  supports  that  conclusion
[independent copyrightability]. The definition in the Act adverts to a “work prepared by two or
more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged...” That language contains
no requirement that each contributes an independently copyrightable component to the joint
work. The legislative history similarly elevates intention as the touchstone, without placing any
further parsing as to the copyrightable status of each individual component that the parties
intend to contribute to the work as a whole”; supra note 42, Sec. 6.07, at 6-22.
54  See Childress, 945 F.2d at 506, where Newman J. addresses the issue, lists uniform case
law and indicates that even the Register of Copyright strongly support this view. See Ashton-
Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903
F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990).
55 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
56 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234.
57 Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
58 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232.
59 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232.
60  Aalmuhammed,  202  F.3d  at  1232-1235.  Interestingly,  this  case  deals  with  a
cinematographic work. The text of the decision expressly asks “who should be considered the
author  of  a  movie”  and then develop  a reasoning  concerning  the subjects  involved  in  the
workflow and their tasks (id. at 1232). A completely different solution is provided by the Italian
Copyright Act where cinematographic works are considered a special category of joint works,
where authorship is recognized for the director, the screen play writer, the composer of the
soundtrack and the artistic director, while economics rights vest to the producer.
independent copyrightability to Aalmuhammed's contributions, notwithstanding.61  That is to
say, in cases of joint authorship, not just a more-than-Goldstein, but apparently, a more-than-
Feist standard is required. In order to be eligible for co-authorship, the normal standard for
copyrightability, as stated in the Act and in all case law, is no longer sufficient.
Even though this holding of the Ninth Circuit certainly has contributed to harmonize
some of the more controversial concepts and tests of previous decisions, the result is far from
being in accordance with the Copyright Act and the Constitution. LaFrance leaves no doubt:  62
The relationship test [i.e. the nature of the intent inquiry] has allowed joint
work  status  to  be  denied  even  when  several  collaborators  have  made
substantial  copyrightable  contributions into a unitary work.  This restrictive
view of joint authorship goes far beyond what is necessary to distinguish joint
works from derivative works, compilations, and collective works, and denies
economic rewards to persons whose creative efforts satisfy the constitutional
and statutory concepts of authorship.
However, it must be noted that the courts' effort in narrowing the applicability of joint
works has not been totally pointless. The amount of creative collaboration that may result in
joint  works  has  increased  at  a  rate  not  even  imaginable  until  few  years  ago,  when  the
Copyright  Act  of  1976  came  into  force.  The  shift  to  a  digital  and  networked  economy,
particularly  significant  for  the “cultural”  industries,  has substantially  changed the typical
form  of  production  of  the  past  industrial  century.  That  shift  enormously  facilitated  the
chances to share tools, creativity and results. Internet and the World Wide Web are strongly
grounded  in  such  a  collaborative  and  interconnected  productive  system63 and  the  latest
developments  of  those  technologies,  as  witnessed  by  “Web  2.0”  and  “social  media”,
corroborate this reasoning even further.
Similarly, it is also noteworthy that the Copyright Act of 1976 strongly reduced the
applicability of the “work for hire” doctrine. Consequently, those situations that until 1978
vested authorship to employers that had some kind of control over their employees (i.e. where
an  implied  conveyance  theory was  found  to  work),  hereinafter  have  been  increasingly
addressed  through  joint  authorship.64 The  “reluctance  of  courts  in  applying  joint  work
category” too broadly,  is probably connected to the consequences in terms of  ownership.
Where joint authorship is recognised, rules of tenancy in common must be applied.65
4.1 Infringing one's own copyright?
61 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232.
62  LaFrance, supra note 47, at 255. Others have spoken about a “uncertain realm of policy”,
see Lior Zemer, “Is intent to co-author an “uncertain realm of policy”?, 30 Colum. J. L. & Arts
611, (2007).
63  Manuel  Castells,  “The  information  age:  economy,  society,  and  culture” (Blackwell
Publishers, 1996).
64  LaFrance,  supra note 47, at 194-195; see also  Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid,  846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
65  “[...] court-made law on this point is left undisturbed. Under the bill, as under present law,
co-owners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common, with each co-owner
having an independent right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting
to the other co-owners for any profits”;  see House Report,  supra note 44, at 5736; Nimmer,
supra note 42, Sec. 6.09, at 6-26; Goldstein,  supra note 52, Sec. 4.2.2, at 4:20; Harvard Law
Review Association, “Accountability among co-owners of statutory copyright”, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
1550 (1959); Noble v. D. Van Nostrand Co., 164 A.2d 834 837-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960);
Crosney v. Edward Small Productions, 52 F.Supp. 559, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Spyke, supra note
38, at 464.
Tenancy in common rules govern the relationship among co-authors of a joint work, except
where  there  is  an agreement to  the  contrary.  Consequently,  each co-author  shares  equal
ownership of the joint work.66 This is notwithstanding the fact that an author's contributions
to the joint  work are deemed qualitatively  or quantitatively  different.67 Usually  the U.S.A.
courts have applied, by analogy, the rules governing tenancy in common in real property.68
Applying tenancy in common rules means, for example, that a suit for infringement
against one's co-author may not be filed, because “it is not possible to infringe one's own
copyright.”69 Therefore, a co-owner may either use the work himself or license such a use to
third parties, without the necessity of other co-author's consent, his only obligation being a
duty  to  account  to  the  latter.  In  real  property  tenancy  in  common,  each  co-tenant  may
possess, or give others the right to possess, the entire parcel and require each co-tenant to
account to the others for their fractional share of any profit earned from the use.70
It has been argued that if in the case of a co-author directly using the joint work, he
has a conceivable duty to account to other co-authors, in cases of real property, a co-tenant in
possession is not liable for the value of his occupancy.71 However, courts are in accordance
with affirming an obligation of accounting to other co-authors, even in cases of direct use. 72 It
is noteworthy that, in so affirming, the courts depart from the real property rule and rely on
the  constructive  trust  theory.73 However,  in  the  case  of  a  copyright  licence,  only  a  non-
exclusive licence may be legally granted in the absence of the other co-author's consent. An
exclusive licence is included in the concept of transfer of copyright, thus being subject to a
unanimous consent.74 A co-owner may legally transfer only his interest in the joint work to
third  parties,  while  he  cannot  transfer  his  co-authors’  interest  without  their  consent.75
Therefore, being an exclusive licence, a  species of transfer, it may be granted only through
unanimity. On the contrary, a non-exclusive licence may be legally granted by only one co-
author.76 
Analogizing from real property joint ownership, an exclusive licence is intended as a
form of “destruction” of the copyright in the common good, while a non-exclusive licence is
considered to be incapable of destroying it. However, this kind of analogical interpretation is
troublesome,  at  least  in  some  circumstances.  For  example,  if  a  court  holds  that  such  a
destruction  will  be  probable  even  in  the  case  of  a  non-exclusive  licence,  it  should  “not
hesitate  to  invalidate  those  licences  executed  by  only  one  joint  owner,  even  before  the
66  Nimmer,  supra note 42, Sec. 6.08, at 6-25; Goldstein,  supra note 52, Sec. 4.2.2, at 4:21;
see also  Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 F. 909 (2d Cir. 1921);  Sweet Music, Inc. v.
Melrose Music Corp., 189 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
67  Nimmer,  supra note 42, Sec. 6.08, at 6-25; Goldstein,  supra note 52, Sec. 4.2.2, at 4:21;
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1489 (D.C. Circ. 1988); Maurel v.
Smith, 271 Fed. 211 (2d Circ. 1921).
68  Nimmer points out how such a situation is not to be confused with “joint tenancy”, which
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copyright; see Goldstein, supra note 52, Sec. 4.2.2, at 4:23.
72  See Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211, 216 (2d Circ. 1921);  Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry
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73 See Goldstein, supra note 52, Sec. 4.2.2, at 4:23.
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conveyance,  alienation,  or  hypothecation  of  a  copyright  or  of  any  of  the  exclusive  rights
comprised  in  a  copyright,  whether  or  not  it  is  limited  in  time  or  place  of  effect,  but  not
including a non-exclusive licence”; see 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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exploitation and resulting destruction has occurred.”77 
Such a tenancy in common regime applies even if the contributions have been very
different in terms of quantity or quality. It is legitimate to envisage a situation where a co-
author, who contributed in a lesser extent to writing, is lawfully admitted to use this writing
or to create a new edition, without the obligation to ask consent from anybody. At the same
time, it is conceivable that the author of a short musical composition intended to be attached
to a considerably longer sequence of images is permitted to use the whole work, or even just
the images, in order to create a new derivative work.78 It is apparent why some have defined
this  as  the  possibility  that  a  co-author  “appropriates”  the  interdependent  and  separately
copyrightable contributions of another.79 
While in cases of inseparable contributions tenancy in common is probably the most
efficient regulatory solution in terms of ownership, in cases of interdependent contributions,
it no longer seems to be the case. If the individual contribution of the co-author is separable
(in  the sense  that  it  is  interdependent)  from the joint  work,  and on the top of  that,  the
contribution is independently copyrightable, then the idea that this part of the work should be
governed by tenancy in common rules with the relative “appropriation” risk,  instead of  a
“classic”  copyright  rule,  is  to  be  rebutted.  Additionally,  in  light  of  the  above  discussion
regarding the intent requisite in joint works, the “inherent and unavoidable danger [...] is
denial of authorial contributions.”80 Thus if the purpose is to protect the final work as a whole,
then the ownership rules that apply to collective works seem to be more appropriate. 81 In this
manner,  not  only  the  final  collaborative  product,  but  also  the  individual,  autonomously
copyrightable, and separable contribution would be protected, and any “appropriation risk” is
avoided.
Under an anticommons point of view, the north-American situation is not so severe as
compared to the Italian one, since the only unanimous deliberation requirement relates to the
transfer of the work, a term which includes an exclusive licence. In this system, the economic
existence of the good is favoured, sometimes regardless – or even against – the interest of one
or  more  if  its  authors/owners.  Although,  the  continuous  growing  of  collaborative
opportunities,  favoured by  the  networked digital  economy,  and since  1978,  by  legislative
reform, has recently been at the basis of what has been indicated as the intent of narrowing
the joint work applicability by courts. A substantial role in this trend is played by the weight
that transfers and exclusive licences have acquired, especially in the digital environment.
The  aim  of  the  courts  is  not  totally  futile  of  course,  since  recognizing  too  many
77  Nimmer,  supra note 42, Sec. 6.10[A], at 6-29. However it is recognized that the analogy
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Supp.  165 (S.D.N.Y.  1947),  affirming such a destruction;  denying this  possibility  Shapiro v.
Fields, 152 N.Y. Supp. 487 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
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79  Therese M. Brady, “Manifest intent and copyrightability: the destiny of joint authorship”,
17 Fordham Urb. L. J. 257, (1989).
80  Lior Zemer, “Is intent to co-author an “uncertain realm of policy”?”, 30 Colum. J. L. & Arts
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authorial contributions in an environment where exclusive licences are a touchstone could
bring about an  anticommons situation similar to the Italian case.  Furthermore,  a “risk of
appropriation” and denial of authorial contributions are real dangers that have been already
reported by more than one scholar, especially in the case of interdependent contributions. 
Notwithstanding, the way in which courts tried to pursue this purpose is questionable.
If recognizing too many authorial contributions is seen as a danger, then the cure proposed by
north-American  courts  so  far,  seems  worse  than  the  sickness  that  they  aim  to  address.
Applying  the  Goldstein  standard,  beyond  narrowing  such  applicability,  is  also  a  valuable
instrument to protect the Public Domain by refusing to give protection to those contributions
that are not creative, and thus deserve no protection through copyright. It is noteworthy that
some of the cases involving such discussions, have motion picture (cinematographic) works as
subject  matter,  a  category  for  which  in  Italy  there  is  a  special  rule:  favouring  four
predetermined types of authors, morally, and the producer, economically. It may not be the
fairest solution every time, but at least this rule bears the important characteristic of legal
certainty.
5. Conclusion
As  a  general  comparative  conclusion  regarding  the  convergence  of  definitions  and  the
divergence of  operative rules,  we have identified a fundamental aspect that is omitted in
other studies: the ownership regime in the case of a joint authorship. How such ownership
operates is often not considered in copyright analysis because it falls outside the traditional
realm of  copyright  law.  Both the  systems studied herein  are  linked to  the external  legal
concept  of  tenancy  in  common.  From the  analysis  of  the  workings  of  the  provisions  on
tenancy in common, which in both jurisdictions were originally meant exclusively for material
property,  we  have  reconstructed  an  original  explanation  of  why  the  usage  of  the  same
category, beside close definitions, has been so different. We described the advantages and
disadvantages of such different implementations, and observed how commentators and courts
have changed their positions over time in order to adapt to the new trends in the “cultural”
industries, in society, in legislation and in the technological development.
In conclusion, we propose a solution in order to limit  the dangerous and opposite
deviations  that  many observers  have  correctly  identified in  both  implementations.  Where
contributions are distinguishable, the use of tenancy in common rules proves to be fallacious,
especially  where  tenancy  in  common  works  on  a  “disjunctive”  basis  (U.S.A.).  In  such  a
situation, the appropriation risk is evident: the possibility of one contributor using the other's
contribution to create a new work of which she will be the exclusive author, without having
any requirement to ask permission, being the original a joint work – and one “cannot infringe
her own copyright.” On the Italian side, the same action would probably require unanimity,
and thus the problem is avoided. However, precisely the exasperation of unanimity rules on
the  Italian  side  (with  the  connected  anticommons threat)  has  created  an  even  clearer
consequence: a joint work construction is rarely used (apart those cases statutorily defined).
Tenancy in common rules should be used as an “extreme ratio” in all  those cases
where  it  is  impossible,  or  too  costly,  to  operate  otherwise,  namely  when and only  when
contributions are not distinguishable. Nevertheless, in such cases the rules on tenancy in
common  should  be  softened  in  those  jurisdictions  –  such  as  Italy  –  where  unanimity  is
required for almost any type of use. A majority rule for the most important uses (moral rights
and exclusive licences), is probably the best solution. For minor uses, such as non-exclusive
licences, a disjunctive administration would probably favour the blossoming of such category,
and should be looked at with favour in all those cases where it does not harm the concomitant
use  of  the  other  co-tenants.  By  following  these  simple  policy  recommendations,  we  are
confident that a joint work system in copyright law would reward co-authors with an efficient
and fair ownership in a common good.
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